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______________________________________ 
 
Abstract: Recent sociological and psychological debates concern the nature of the 
relation between changing religious beliefs and changing significance of the 
family. The current study analyzes multilevel relations between religiosity 
(personal and culture-level) and several aspects of family orientation for n = 4902 
adolescents from 18 nations/areas from diverse cultural contexts covering a 
number of religious denominations with data from the Value-of-Children-Study 
(Trommsdorff & Nauck, 2005). In addition, cultural values from the World Values 
Survey representing religious versus secular values as well as survival versus self-
expression values are examined at the cultural level of analysis as a joint effect 
with nation-level economic development. Results showed that religiosity/religious 
values were positively related to all aspects of adolescents’ family orientation at 
the individual as well as the cultural level, while societal affluence was only 
related to a loss of importance of the traditional and hierarchical aspects of family 
orientation. Postmaterialist self-expression values were unrelated to adolescents’ 
family orientation. 
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Introduction 
 
Religions represent significant value systems that affect the way 
(religious) people feel, think and behave – also and especially with respect 
to the family. At the same time, the family as the place where major 
socialization processes occur plays an important role for children’s and 
adolescents’ religious (or nonreligious) development (e.g., Trommsdorff, 
2012). At the societal level, economic and cultural changes are related to a 
(debated) loss of significance of both religion and the family in many 
societies. Religion and the family are thus closely linked at the societal as 
well as at the individual level. However, it is an open question as to how far 
changes in the importance given to religion have affected changes in the 
family and/or vice versa (Eberstadt, 2013). The current study adds cross-
cultural evidence with regard to individual-level and culture-level relations 
between religiosity and several aspects of adolescents’ family orientation. 
Adolescence is a time when the search for an identity becomes salient, 
and religion has been (and still is in many cultural regions) the main source 
of answers to existential questions. The transition to adulthood is also 
related to questions regarding what it means to be an adult, including 
having one’s own family. Most adolescents all over the world would like to 
have a family in the future, although the ideas about and the values 
regarding family relationships differ widely (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007; Mayer 
& Trommsdorff, 2010). The main focus of the current study is therefore on 
the relation between adolescents’ religiosity and aspects of their family 
orientation. Taking a cross-cultural and multilevel perspective, we will 
explore the individual-level relations between religiosity and 
socioeconomic status with traditional as well as nontraditional aspects of 
adolescents’ family orientation. Further, we will analyze culture-level 
relations of societal indicators representing 1) the importance of religion 
(vs. secular-rational values); 2) the importance of an individualistic/self-
expression cultural orientation; and 3) of societal affluence, with aspects of 
adolescents’ family orientation. The analyses are based on data from 18 
nations/regions from the cross-cultural research project “Value of Children 
and Intergenerational Relations” (Trommsdorff & Nauck, 2005). 
We define adolescents’ family orientation in a broad sense in order to 
study the effects of religiosity on both traditional normative as well as more 
psychological and future-oriented aspects of the family. Thus, in our study 
family orientation encompasses a) traditional family values (related to 
hierarchical family roles and to the importance of the family cohesion vis-
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à-vis the outside world), b) whether or not adolescents would like to have 
children themselves in the future (and how many), and c) the importance of 
two different kinds of reasons for having children (value of children, 
VOC). The value of children is related to the needs that children fulfill for 
their parents and the benefits they provide (Hoffman & Hoffman, 1973). 
While the VOC-construct has been originally conceived as an individual-
level psychological mediating factor in the relation between macro-cultural 
changes and changes in fertility rates (Arnold et al., 1975), the two main 
dimensions, utilitarian-normative VOC and psychological VOC, can also 
be seen as generalized value orientations reflecting different aspects of 
family orientation, namely a traditional aspect (utilitarian-normative VOC) 
versus a nontraditional subjective emotional aspect (psychological VOC) 
(Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982, 2007). Mayer and Trommsdorff (2010) showed in a 
twelve-culture study with adolescents from the VOC-study that cross-
cultural differences with regard to utilitarian-normative VOC were 
immense (with societal affluence related to a lower importance of these 
reasons for having children) while few differences resulted for the 
psychological VOC (high in all cultures).  
Thus, the main question of the current study is: How are religiosity as 
well as socioeconomic status related to traditional aspects of adolescents’ 
family orientation, and how are they related to personal and future-oriented 
aspects of adolescents’ family orientation (psychological values of children 
and intended number of children) – both at the individual level as well as at 
the cultural level? In the following sections we will discuss the link 
between religion/religiosity and family orientation separately for the 
cultural level (closely related to cultural/societal change) and for the 
individual level (focusing on psychological and socialization processes). 
 
 
Religion and the Family: Culture-Level Links 
 
Many religious traditions (e.g., Islam, Judaism, most traditions in 
Christianity) declare family relations and specific family roles and 
hierarchies as sacred. Taking the Christian tradition as an example, the 
Bible (especially parts of the Old Testament) affirms and authorizes 
positive norms of filial obligations and assistance to family members. The 
milestones of family life, such as birth and marriage, are celebrated through 
religious rituals and ceremonies. Thus, the importance and normativity of 
religion in a specific cultural context should be related to the importance 
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and normativity of the family in this context, reflecting a positive 
correlation at the cultural level.  
With regard to this culture-level link we have to consider processes of 
cultural and economic change over time that have led to a decline of both 
religion and the family during the last decades. Although a general decline 
of religiosity and a concomitant rise of secular orientations is a 
controversial issue (Halman & Pettersson, 2006), it is largely 
acknowledged that the phenomenon of secularization, reflecting a 
continuous decline of religiosity in Western Europe and the English-
speaking world during the second half of the 20th century, has empirical 
validity (Eberstadt, 2013). In a large-scale longitudinal study of religion 
and its intergenerational transmission, Bengtson and colleagues analyzed 
the changes of religious beliefs, values, and practices across three decades 
and three connected generations in the United States. From 1971 to 2000 
there was a considerable decline of reported religious affiliation for all 
three generations (Bengtson, Copen, Putney, & Silverstein, 2009).  
Secularization has been described as resulting from economic 
development and related modernization and individualization processes: 
economic prosperity and the rise of welfare state provisions can buffer 
existential risks related to religious needs (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). 
Furthermore, a number of phenomena that are more or less linked to 
modernization processes, such as the rise of rational and scientific thinking 
starting with the enlightenment era, have contributed to a loss of the 
importance of religion (Eberstadt, 2013). Although it is acknowledged that 
traditional religious values can persist to some degree (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000; Inkeles, 1998), it is often assumed that sooner or later all cultures 
will overcome traditional religious values and prefer secular–rational and 
autonomous self-expressive values (“human development sequence”, see 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). This view has not been unchallenged, however. 
Georgas (2006) argues that the thrust of modernization itself is based on 
religious and cultural values that have developed out of Calvinist 
Protestantism, as originally suggested by Weber ([1904] 1958). In a similar 
vein, Eisenstadt (1973) postulates that the development of transcendental 
religions during the axial age (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Judaism, Christianity, and later Islam) are the basis of later modernization 
processes. In a study of Christian societies with data from the International 
Social Survey Programme, Höllinger and Haller (2009) conclude that 
although traditional forms of religion have declined considerably in some 
cultures, religion continues to play an important role in the public sphere as 
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well as in private life in other cultures. The authors argue that the 
worldviews and doctrines of Protestantism have led to a greater 
“disenchantment of the world” (p. 281) and to a subsequent decline of 
religiosity as compared to Catholicism and Orthodoxy (see also Georgas, 
2006). Furthermore, bureaucratic state churches (as in some Western 
European countries) and communism in most Eastern European nations 
were related to lower religiosity (with the exception of Poland, where 
religiosity declined only after the collapse of communism).  
Theoretical approaches related to modernization have also widely 
discussed a decline of the family. The origins of this process can be traced 
back to the French Revolution, which disturbed the equilibrium of the 
traditional extended family system and patriarchal authority (according to 
Auguste Comte, cited after Georgas, 2006). Similarly, Parsons (1949) 
argued that the industrial revolution required the formation of a nuclear 
family that became more and more alienated from its extended kin 
network. There are manifold indicators of this decline continuing today: an 
increasing number of single-parent families; an increasing divorce rate; an 
increase in step-families and patchwork families; and, most of all, a 
declining birth rate (Georgas, 2006; Goode, 1963). The postnuclear family 
(Popenoe, 1988) is characterized by a further decreasing family size, fewer 
joint activities and less quality contact between parents and children, and 
reduced contact with collateral kin (e.g., aunts, nephews, etc.), but more 
contact with grandparents.  
Bengtson (2001) argues that the increasing importance of 
multigenerational bonds may signify a qualitative change in family 
solidarity structures rather than an overall loss of importance of the family. 
In a similar vein, Pankhurst and Houseknecht (2000) argue that in spite of 
the manifold changes that religion and the family undergo in the modern 
era, both institutions are not on the decline but still vital and important in 
most societies, raising doubts with regard to the general validity of the 
secularization thesis and the thesis of family decline. In addition, 
Kağıtçıbaşı (2007) contends in her theory of family change that despite 
rising affluence, a shift towards a lower overall importance of the family is 
not necessarily taking place in modernizing cultures of the majority (i.e., 
non-Western) world. Rather, she postulates a shift toward a family model of 
psychological interdependence, characterized by continuing 
emotional/psychological interdependence but declining material 
interdependence together with rising personal autonomy. In this family 
model, the traditional hierarchical and financial security aspects of the 
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family are thus assumed to lose significance while the family per se and the 
emotional relations in the family stay important. Thus, the notion of a 
general decline of the family (i.e., a declining importance of all family 
relationships in addition to macro-social indicators like declining fertility 
rates, rising divorce rates, and lesser contact with kin) must be questioned 
in light of the theorizing just presented. In the current study we will not 
study family decline as defined from a sociological perspective, but instead 
analyze adolescents’ family orientation in terms of their family-related 
values and future plans. We will explore whether culture-level indicators of 
economic development, religion, and cultural value orientations are related 
only to the traditional hierarchical and economic aspects of family 
orientation or whether – in addition to that – also the psychological and 
future-oriented aspects of adolescents’ family orientation are affected by 
these culture-level indicators.  
Thus, both the process of secularization and the process of a decline of 
the family (at least in the sociological sense) seem to be fueled first and 
foremost by economic development. As stated above, though, since values 
regarding the family are deeply rooted in many religious traditions, a 
decline of the importance of the family can also result directly from a 
decline of religious beliefs. Indeed, secularization and modernization 
theoretical approaches have championed the hypothesis that religious 
decline actually leads to family decline when religion-based family and 
fertility norms lose their power and set people free to decide for themselves 
whether they want to form a family (by marrying and having children) as 
well as continue a family (at least with respect to marriage/divorce) (Norris 
& Inglehart, 2011). Recently, Eberstadt (2013) argued that the reverse 
process – family decline leading to religious decline – may be an additional 
powerful and hitherto neglected factor explaining the loss of significance of 
both traditional institutions in the Western world. In short, her argument is 
that religion “runs in families” – that religious values are transmitted across 
generations in well-functioning families (see also Trommsdorff, 2009). 
Lower family cohesion as well as a general decline of marriages and a rise 
of divorce rates may therefore lead (or have lead) to a decline of religious 
values and practices. Indeed, according to Boyatzis, Dollahite, and Marks 
(2006) the factor with the greatest impact on children’s religious 
development is the socialization experience within the family. Further, in 
their three-generation longitudinal study, Bengtson et al. (2009) found that 
parents as well as grandparents substantially influenced several aspects of 
their offspring’s religiosity. Thus, for most adolescents, the importance of a 
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specific religious belief is strongly influenced by their family’s religious 
beliefs (see also Regnerus, Smith, & Smith, 2004). Eberstadt (2013) also 
suggests that the family factor could explain what has been called the 
“problem of American exceptionalism”. This “problem” refers to the fact 
that Americans (as compared to Western Europeans) are still very religious 
when considering their very high level of modernization and economic 
development. Attempts to explain this fact include the Puritan religiosity of 
the original immigrants from Europe, but also the notion that the real 
explanandum is actually the very low religiosity of Western Europeans 
(e.g., Beck, 2010). Eberstadt (2013) contends that it is the relative high 
family functioning (e.g., more marriages, more children) in the US as 
compared to Western Europe that can at least partly explain the difference 
in the importance of religion. 
To summarize, we have seen that – from a sociological perspective – 
both religiosity and family orientation have been on decline in large parts 
of the (Western) world, and this development seems to be mainly driven by 
a syndrome called modernization that in turn is powered by economic 
development. But there are also direct relations between (the decline of) 
religiosity and (the decline of) the family. Qualifying this notion, 
alternative theoretical approaches and empirical findings, especially from 
cross-cultural psychology, suggest that a decline of the family may be 
restricted to the traditional hierarchical aspects of the family and to the 
material interdependencies in family relationships that become obsolete 
with economic development; there may be no decline of the family per se, 
especially in modernizing cultures with a collectivistic cultural background 
(Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007). In our study we will try to disentangle these 
relationships by analyzing culture-level effects of religiosity 
(operationalized through Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values 
from the World Values Survey (WVS); World Values Survey, 2009) and 
economic development (operationalized through the Human Development 
Index (HDI); United Nations Development Programme, 2010) on different 
aspects of adolescents’ family orientation. In addition, we will consider 
culture-level effects of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values (World Values 
Survey Association, 2009) on adolescents’ family orientation (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). In earlier writings Inglehart and colleagues  (e.g., Inglehart 
& Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004) referred to this value 
dimension as postmaterialist values that represent a kind of “positive 
individualism”. These values are thought to have been growing out of the 
release of (a great part of) mankind from the shackles of the fight for 
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survival through modernization and economic development. Thus, while 
we focused our discussion on secularization up to now, with the Survival 
vs. Self-Expression dimension a syndrome of 
autonomy/independence/personal choice explicitly enters the stage as part 
of the modernization syndrome. It is unclear whether this additional 
dimension affects family orientation (traditional and/or general) uniquely 
and in addition to the other variables. As we will see below, in our study of 
18 cultures the level of economic development (HDI) was positively 
related to both WVS value dimensions, but the two value dimensions 
themselves were unrelated with each other. It is therefore of special interest 
to analyze the joint as well as the respective unique culture-level 
contributions of affluence, Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational 
Values and of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values to different aspects of 
adolescents’ family orientation.  
 
 
The Importance of Religiosity for the Development of Family 
Orientation in Adolescence: Individual-Level Links 
 
Adolescence is an important period for religious and spiritual 
development. Adolescent identity development comes with an intense 
striving for meaning and a need for autonomy and relatedness (Erikson, 
1968; Youniss & Smollar, 1985). Therefore, adolescents often engage in 
religious and spiritual exploration (Elkind, 1964; Good & Willoughby, 
2008; Oser, Scarlett, & Bucher, 2006). Several studies have shown that 
religiosity is associated with better physical and mental health, and with a 
positive moral development in adolescence (George, Ellison, & Larson, 
2002; King & Furrow, 2004; for a summary see Trommsdorff, 2012).  
As mediators of these effects, religion’s positive influences on social 
capital – social support, and community inclusion were identified (George 
et al., 2002). The family as an essential source of social support plays an 
important role for the link between religiosity and adolescent 
developmental outcomes (Regnerus & Burdette, 2006; Pearce & Thornton, 
2007). However, most studies on religiosity (especially from a 
psychological perspective) are based on Western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, and democratic (WEIRD, see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) 
samples. Few studies shed light on the function of religiosity for adolescent 
development across cultures. In a recently edited volume on the role of 
values and religion in adolescent development in different cultures, 
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Trommsdorff & Chen (2012) included contributions specifically dealing 
with relations among religion, family and culture. In one of the chapters, 
Mayer and Trommsdorff (2012) analyzed cultural differences and 
similarities in the strength of individual-level effects of adolescents’ 
religiosity on their traditional family values as well as their family future 
orientation (importance of having a family in the future). This study used 
partly the same data set as the current study, but with a different theoretical 
and empirical focus, a slightly different sample of cultures, and partly 
different dependent variables. The results of the study showed that the 
individual-level effects of religiosity on adolescents’ family orientation 
differed across cultures and that the differences could be partly explained 
by the cultural mean level of adolescents’ aggregated religiosity. This 
cultural mean level of religiosity can be interpreted as representing a level 
of normativity of religion in a specific culture. The direction of the effect 
was such that a stronger cultural normativity of religion was related to a 
stronger individual-level effect of religiosity on traditional family values, 
illustrating the interplay between cultural norms and individual values. In 
another study, Sabatier, Mayer, Friedlmeier, Lubiewska, and Trommsdorff 
(2011) found that religiosity was indirectly related to adolescent life 
satisfaction via family orientation in four cultures with a Christian religious 
background (France, Germany, Poland, and the United States); and in a 
study of US adolescents with Latin American, Asian, and European 
backgrounds, Lopez, Huynh, and Fuligni (2011) showed that regardless of 
religious and cultural background, changes in adolescents’ religious 
identity were closely related to changes in their family identity. 
Religions are packed with values - generalized notions of what is good 
and desirable that influence behavior in a number of domains (Schwartz, 
2012). Indeed, values, related moral prescriptions, and the reasoning related 
to these could be seen as the core of religious teachings. Though different 
religions harbor different values, religiosity by itself (and therefore in a 
universalistic sense) may be related to a certain set of values that may in 
turn relate to different ways of ‘doing family’. In early cross-cultural 
studies on the role of religion for value orientations, religious participants 
reported a higher importance of values like salvation, forgiveness, and 
obedience than did nonreligious participants, who reported a higher 
importance of independence, pleasure, and intellectualism (Rokeach, 
1969). Later studies using the Schwartz’ circumplex model of values 
tended to find similar associations (e.g., Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). In a 
meta-analysis, Saroglou, Delpierre, and Dernelle (2004) corroborated these 
The Role of Religiosity and Affluence for Adolescents’ Family Orientation                 B. Mayer et al.  
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 7 (3), 2015  
 
 
56 
findings across 21 samples from 15 countries and three denominations 
(Christians, Jews, and Muslims): higher religiosity was positively related to 
values supporting the preservation of the social order and to prosocial 
values while it was negatively related to values promoting openness to 
change and autonomy as well as to hedonistic values. This brings us 
directly to the topic of religions as cultural systems propagating family 
ideologies by instilling an “ethos” of the family (Chatters & Taylor, 2005; 
Pankhurst & Houseknecht, 2000; Pearce & Thornton, 2007). Moral 
directives derived from religious doctrines (e.g., that children are advised to 
honor their parents) “can constitute a key form of religious influence 
among youth” and can offer “purposes and processes that have no direct 
equivalent within secular systems of meaning and motivation.” (Regnerus 
& Burdette, 2006, p. 178). Religion therefore has a powerful impact on 
adolescents and their development (Benson, Donahue & Erickson, 1989) 
including the formation of childbearing preferences (Pearce, 2002). 
Religion emphasizes a strong family orientation, thus enhancing the 
motivation for having children (Barber, 2000). It influences individual 
behavior directly by promoting pronatalist values, such as encouraging 
marriage and responsible parenthood (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1988).  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The current study explores multilevel relationships between religious 
values and economic development with adolescents’ family orientation 
across 18 cultural groups. We will relate two culture-level indicators taken 
from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2009; 
one of them representing religious values) and the Human Development 
Index (UNDP, 2010) (representing the level of economic development of a 
culture) to hierarchical/traditional as well as to personal/future-oriented 
aspects of adolescents’ family orientation using data from the Value of 
Children Study. At the individual level, adolescents’ personal religiosity 
and their family’s socioeconomic status are used as predictors. 
Relationships at both levels are simultaneously analyzed using hierarchical 
linear modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
In the theoretical part we considered only the individual-level relation 
between adolescents’ religiosity and their family orientation. Now we will 
additionally include adolescents’ (or rather: their family’s) self-reported 
socioeconomic status as another individual-level predictor. The self-
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reported socioeconomic status indicates an adolescent’s perceived status 
relative to others in his/her cultural group. One could argue that a relatively 
high socioeconomic status should be related to a higher family orientation 
(especially with regard to having own children in the future), because a 
certain financial security is necessary to start a family. On the other hand, 
relative socioeconomic status could be negatively related to more 
traditional aspects of family orientation like the utilitarian-normative value 
of children since a high status may reduce the importance of having 
children for economic reasons. In particular, the following hypotheses will 
be tested: 
1) Based on the considerations in the theoretical part, we expect that, 
overall, individual-level religiosity is positively related to adolescents’ 
family orientation. We hypothesize that this relation holds for all aspects of 
adolescents’ family orientation – the traditional conservative ones 
(traditional family values and utilitarian-normative value of children, see 
below) as well as the more general and future-oriented ones (psychological 
value of children and intended number of children). These expectations are 
based on religions’ overall occupation with family-promoting values, both 
regarding the traditional as well as the general and pronatalist aspects.  
2) With regard to culture-level effects, we expect that both the 
importance of traditional-religious values as well as societal affluence have 
important implications for the role of the significance of the family in a 
society. As discussed above, however, a high level of socioeconomic 
development cannot be equated with religious decline/secularization since 
religious traditions often moderate or canalize changes brought about by 
modernization processes. Consequently, both phenomena are assumed to 
have unique effects on adolescents’ family orientation across cultures. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that  
a) Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values (i.e., a dimension 
representing non-religiosity at the positive pole) will be negatively related 
to all four aspects of adolescents’ family orientation, based on the above 
argument that religion affects all facets of family life;  
b) Societal affluence (HDI) is also related to all aspect of adolescents’ 
family orientation, based on modernization theoretical arguments (family 
decline); based on alternative culture-psychological and sociological 
conceptions of family change (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007), we could, however, 
expect that the HDI will be negatively related only to the material and to 
the traditional aspects of adolescents’ family orientation but not to the 
general and personal ones. 
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c) Survival vs. Self-Expression Values (i.e., a dimension representing the 
importance of autonomy/independence/self-expression at the positive pole) 
may be negatively related only to the traditional aspects of adolescents’ 
family orientation, but not to the general and personal ones, based on the 
premises that this dimension is explicitly related to financial/existential 
security (at the cultural level) but also to a postmodernist self-actualization 
perspective that is not opposed to the notion of having (and being happy 
with) a family. 
 
 
Sample 
 
The study is part of the cross-cultural study “Value of Children and 
Intergenerational Relations” (VOC-IR study; Trommsdorff & Nauck, 
2005), which has been carried out in 18 nations and regions. The VOC 
study is a three-generation study that includes about 300 adolescents, their 
mothers, and about 100 maternal grandmothers in each of the countries 
studied. Countries from diverse geographical regions were included to 
represent a wide range of cultural orientations towards religion and the 
family. In cultures with continuing strong urban-rural differences (i.e., 
China, India, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, Turkey), samples from both 
rural and urban areas were included. In all other cultures, participants were 
from suburban or urban regions. In multiethnic countries (Indonesia, Israel, 
South Africa, USA) ethnically homogeneous samples were collected 
because the samples sizes did not allow for further differentiations. 
Participants from Israel were all Jewish, partly from secular and partly 
from orthodox Jewish contexts. Participants from South Africa were 
recruited from the Northern Sotho cultural group (Limpopo Province), 
whose standard of living is considerably below the South African average 
(Sam, Peltzer, & Mayer, 2005). There were two Indian samples: one from 
Northern India (Varanasi area), and one from Southern India (Pondicherry 
area). Since the two Indian samples are culturally diverse and speak 
different languages (Hindi in the North, Tamil in the South) we considered 
them as separate cultural groups for our analyses. 
The procedures of recruitment were adapted to the specific 
circumstances of the respective country. In most countries, families were 
recruited through the schools of the target adolescents. In some contexts, 
participants were chosen through resident registration lists, by a random 
selection from telephone books, or by a multistage cluster procedure. The 
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data collection of most of the cultures took place between 2002 and 2004 
(China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey), in Poland and the 
United States between 2005 and 2007, in Russia in the years 2006 and 
2007, and in Estonia in 2009. Thus, while the data collection extended over 
a quite long period, most of the data were collected within about four years. 
Furthermore, in light of the stability of basic cultural features and the 
relatively slow pace of cultural change regarding religious and other very 
basic values (Saroglou, 2012), we believe that the differences in data 
collection time are not questioning the validity of our results. 
In the current study only the adolescent sample was used. Overall, N = 
4902 adolescents (and some emerging adults) (58.6 % females) participated 
in the study. The samples in the eighteen cultural groups varied between n 
= 100 (Romania) and n = 381 (Italy), and the percentage of females varied 
between 50.0 % (India, Pondicherry) and 64.1 % (United States) with the 
exception of the Czech Republic, where only females participated in the 
study. The adolescents were between 12 and 23 years old, with 97.5% of 
the sample being between 13 and 19 years old (“teenagers”); the overall 
mean age was 15.57 years (SD = 1.65 years) and the median age was 16 
years. All adolescents over the age of 20 came from Switzerland (M = 19.8 
years), where a somewhat older sample including emerging adults up to the 
age of 23 was realized (n = 70 participants from Switzerland were older 
than 19 years). Age differed significantly across the twenty cultural groups, 
F(17, 4823) = 235.84, p < .001. The sample sizes as well as the means and 
standard deviations of age per culture are shown in Table 1. In a first round 
of analyses all models were run with age as a covariate. Since the results 
did not differ compared to models without the age variable, we report the 
results without covariates to reduce the complexity of the multilevel 
analyses.  
 
 
Procedure 
 
In all cultures participants were surveyed by members of the local 
collaborating team. They completed the VOC-IR study questionnaire for 
adolescents (Trommsdorff, Nauck, Schwarz, Chakkarath, & Schwenk, 
2002) either at home (during the mothers’ interview, but in a separate 
place) or in school. The questionnaire contained questions concerning 
sociodemographic characteristics, religiosity, the (grand)parent-child 
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relationship, parenting, attachment, exchange of support between the 
generations, family-related values and self-construals, subjective well-
being, peer relationships, and future plans. All language versions were 
translated from the original English version into the respective target 
language by a bilingual native speaker of the target language. The 
questionnaires were then back translated and inconsistencies were corrected 
in cooperation with the translators from the respective cultures. Of all 
instruments, the current study includes only the measures related to 
adolescents’ religiosity, family-related values, and family-related future 
plans, that are introduced in the following. 
 
 
Measures 
 
Individual-level predictors. Individual-level predictors were 
adolescents’ self-reported religiosity and socioeconomic status. To assess 
religiosity, we asked for the participants’ religious belief/denomination and 
for the importance of these beliefs. The latter was a one-item measure, with 
ratings ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important); this item 
was only to be answered when a specific religious belief/denomination was 
indicated before. In case participants indicated that they were not 
religious/had no religious affiliation, a value of 1 (not important at all) was 
set a posteriori in the importance measure. The cross-cultural differences in 
religiosity were highly significant, F(17, 4792) = 237.16, p < .001, η2 = .46. 
Estonian adolescents reported the lowest religiosity (M = 1.38) while 
Indonesian adolescents reported the highest religiosity (M = 4.84). With the 
exception of Indonesia (SD = 0.41, probably due to a ceiling effect), there 
was substantial within-culture variation in religiosity with standard 
deviations ranging from SD = 0.84 (Estonian adolescents) to SD = 1.39 
(Chinese adolescents). Means and standard deviations per culture are 
shown in Table 1. To assess adolescents’ relative socioeconomic status, we 
asked participants to answer the question: “Compared to others living here 
in (name of the country): What economic status do you consider yourself to 
have?” on a scale from 1 (low) over 2 (lower middle), 3 (middle), and 4 
(upper middle), to 5 (upper). Since by mistake in the Estonian 
questionnaire only those adolescents who were currently working (in 
gainful employment) indicated their socioeconomic status we used the 
socioeconomic status indicated by adolescents’ mothers as a proxy of 
household socioeconomic status in Estonia. 
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Table 1. Sample, Age, Religiosity, Socioeconomic Status and Culture-Level Indicators 
Culture N Females % Age 
M (SD) 
Religiosity 
M (SD) 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
M (SD) 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI)a 
Traditional-
Religious versus 
Secular-Rational 
Valuesb 
Survival versus 
Self-Expression 
Valuesb 
China 306 57.8 13.82  (1.14) 2.36  (1.39) 2.68  (0.75) 0.772 1.000 -1.045 
Czech Republic 260 100.0 13.76  (0.80) 1.54  (1.14) 3.17  (0.67) 0.903 1.230 0.380 
Estonia 298 50.7 15.53  (1.12) 1.38  (0.84) 2.66  (0.68) 0.883 1.270 -1.190 
France 200 55.0 15.73  (1.21) 2.38  (1.33) 3.47  (0.59) 0.961 0.575 1.035 
Germany 311 55.9 15.67  (1.07) 2.29  (1.31) 3.22  (0.59) 0.947 1.310c 0.510c 
India (Pondicherry) 300 50.0 14.86  (0.99) 3.81  (1.02) 2.73  (0.72) 0.612 -0.440 -0.405 
India (Varanasi) 300 50.7 16.01  (1.50) 4.28  (0.90) 3.17  (1.00) 0.612 -0.440 -0.405 
Indonesia 300 55.0 15.25  (1.00) 4.84  (0.41) 2.83  (0.73) 0.734 -0.770 -0.650 
Israel 188 63.3 15.77  (1.38) 3.53  (1.17) 2.87  (0.65) 0.935 0.260 0.360 
Italy 381 53.8 17.01  (1.27) 2.79  (1.17) 3.10  (0.80) 0.951 0.160 0.725 
Japan 207 62.8 16.46  (0.77) 1.74  (1.07) 3.07  (0.72) 0.960 1.935 0.245 
Poland 327 60.2 15.21  (1.26) 3.91  (0.91) 3.06  (0.71) 0.880 -0.605 -0.370 
Romania 100 52.0 14.92  (1.24) 4.16  (0.92) 3.31  (0.67) 0.837 -0.335 -1.575 
Russia 333 54.4 16.06  (1.39) 2.92  (1.09) 2.76  (0.61) 0.817 0.790 -1.650 
South Africa 317 61.5 14.96  (1.21) 4.14  (1.06) 2.63  (0.87) 0.683 -1.105 -0.100 
Switzerland 131 58.0 19.84  (1.92) 2.59  (1.35) 3.17  (0.69) 0.960 0.740 1.900 
Turkey 306 52.9 14.74  (1.11) 3.93  (1.07) 3.13  (0.85) 0.806 -0.875 -0.335 
USA 337 64.1 16.24  (1.45) 3.80  (1.33) 3.22  (0.70) 0.956 -0.665 1.675 
Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Religiosity is both an individual-level predictor (group-centered) and a culture-level predictor (cultural mean values) in the 
multilevel models. a Human Development Index as of 2007 (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). b derived from the World Value Survey, positive values refer 
to a more secular/self-expressive orientation. c sample weighted mean of the values of East Germany and West Germany (samples from both regions were included in the 
German sample). 
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The cross-cultural differences in socioeconomic status were significant, 
F(17, 4660) = 29.20, p < .001, η2 = .10. Estonian participants reported the 
lowest socioeconomic status (M = 2.60) while French participants reported the 
highest socioeconomic status (M = 3.47) (see Table 1). Overall, the eighteen 
cultural groups were relatively similar with regard to their relative 
socioeconomic status - all groups would be categorized as middle class – and 
this enhances the validity of the cross-cultural comparisons on the variables of 
interest. The within-culture variation in socioeconomic status was also 
relatively low with some exceptions (especially with regard to cultures where 
both rural and urban groups were surveyed): standard deviations ranged from 
SD = 0.59 (French adolescents) to SD = 1.00 (Varanasi Indian adolescents). 
Culture-level predictors. Multilevel analyses were carried out with three 
culture-level indicators external to the current data set: the Human 
Development Index (HDI, UNDP, 2009) as well as the two most prominent 
value dimensions from the World Values Survey (WVS, World Value Survey 
Association, 2009): Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values and 
Survival vs. Self-Expression Values. According to Inglehart and Oyserman 
(2004), the former represents the dimension of religiosity1 while the latter is 
strongly related to the collectivism/interdependence versus 
individualism/independence dimension. To assess the relationship among the 
culture-level indicators we used both Pearson (r) as well as Spearman rank 
correlations (rS) to account for potential biases arising from the distribution of 
these indicators as well as from the low sample size. The correlations among 
the three culture-level indicators showed that the HDI was positively correlated 
with both Survival vs. Self-Expression Values (r = 0.54, p < .05; rS = 0.71, p < 
.001; see Figure 1a) and Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values (r = 
0.53, rS = 0.49, both p < .05; see Figure 1b), while the latter were uncorrelated 
                                                        
1 This was confirmed by a very strong negative correlation between Traditional-Religious vs. 
Secular-Rational Values from the WVS and the cultural mean values of our individual-level 
religiosity measure from the Value of Children Study: r = -0.92, rS = -0.88,  both p < .001 (n = 
18). 
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with each other (r = 0.07, rS = 0.05, both p > .05; see Figure 1c).  
 
 
Figure 1a. Scatterplot of the Human Development Index (HDI; UNDP, 2010) and 
“Survival vs. Self-Expression Values” from the World Values Survey (World Values 
Survey Association, 2009) for the Nations in the Current Study (r = 0.54, rS = 0.71). 
 
 
 
The Role of Religiosity and Affluence for Adolescents’ Family Orientation                          B. Mayer et al.  
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 7 (3), 2015  
 
64 
 
Figure 1b. Scatterplot of the Human Development Index (HDI; UNDP, 2009) and 
“Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values” (World Values Survey 
Association, 2009) for the Nations in the Current Study (r = 0.53, rS = 0.49). 
 
 
While the substantial positive correlations between the HDI and each of the 
WVS indicators is related to the fact that the ‘positive’ poles of both 
Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values and  Survival vs. Self-
Expression Values are linked to economic development (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2011), the zero-correlation between the two WVS 
indicators seems to suggest that secularization and (‘self-expressive’) 
individualization represent two different processes of cultural change. While a 
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week relation between the two WVS indicators is reported by Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005), the very low correlation encountered here may be partly 
sample-specific: the sample includes a highly self-expressive cultural group 
that is at the same time relatively traditional-religious (United States); on the 
other hand, Estonia, Russia and China are three very secular-rational cultures 
that are at the same time low on self-expression. 
 
 
Figure 1c. Scatterplot of World Values Survey Dimensions (WVS, 2009) “Survival vs. 
Self-Expression Values” and “Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-Rational Values” for 
the Nations in the Current Study (r = 0.07, rS = 0.05). 
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For the following multi-item scales we used the coefficient omega 
(McDonald, 1999) as a measure of internal consistency/reliability. In contrast 
to the commonly used Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, omega does not assume 
essentially tau-equivalent items (i.e., perfect correlations of item true scores) 
but assumes a congeneric model (one that allows different factor loadings of 
items on the common factor).  
Dunn, Baguley, and Brunsden (2014) argue that “few scales, particularly 
those in the personality domain, are ever truly unidimensional and instead 
nearly always possess some degree of multidimensionality“ (p. 402), rendering 
the assumptions underlying Cronbach’s alpha unrealistic. 
 
Different aspects of family orientation as dependent variables.  
First, traditional-conservative family values were assessed using a 5-item 
scale tapping a traditional view on family relationships based on Georgas’ 
(1991) scale. The cross-cultural construct equivalence of this scale has been 
demonstrated (Mayer, Agache, & Trommsdorff, 2009). Overall, the internal 
consistencies (coefficient omega) were not satisfactory for the traditional-
conservative family values scale (see Table 2). Of the 18 cultural groups only 
six had internal consistencies with values > .70, the usual cut-off for acceptable 
reliabilities (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), and four cultures had even omegas 
< .60 (South Africa: .48; Czech Republic: .57; Germany and Romania: .59). 
The low reliabilities of the family-values scale in some cultures may be due to 
the combination of hierarchy-related items (e.g., “Children should obey their 
parents.”) and of items emphasizing the general importance of good family 
relations (e.g., “One should maintain good relationships with one’s relatives.”). 
Since the cross-cultural construct equivalence was demonstrated earlier and 
since traditional family values are a central aspect of family orientation, we 
decided to keep the scale in spite of the relatively low internal consistencies in 
some cultural groups.  
Second, two dimensions tapping the importance of reasons for having 
children (values of children, VOC) were assessed. With regard to the first 
dimension, utilitarian-normative values of children combine economic-
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utilitarian and social-normative reasons for having children (Kağıtçıbaşı, 
1982). Example items include “To have one more person to help your family 
economically” and “Because some of your older relatives feel that you should 
have more children.”  
With the exceptions of Indian adolescents from the Pondicherry area 
(omega = .56) and Israeli adolescents (omega = .68) the internal consistencies 
for this 8-item scale were acceptable (> .70) or satisfactory (> .80) with 
coefficients omega between .75 and .86 (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2. Reliability Analysis: Internal Consistencies of Family Values, Utilitarian-
Normative Value of Children, and Psychological Value of Children 
Culture Family Values Utilitarian-Normative  
Value of Children 
Psychological Value of 
Children 
 Omega 95 % CI Omega 95 % CI Omega 95 % CI 
China .61 [.47, .68] .83 [.80, .86] .90 [.87, .92] 
Czech Republic .57 [.45, .66] .77 [.71, .82] .77 [.71, .82] 
Estonia .69 [.62, .75] .86 [.83, .88] .88 [.85, .90] 
France .71 [.64, .78] .77 [.71, .83] .72 [.63, .79] 
Germany .59 [.50, .66] .80 [.76, .83] .82 [.77, .86] 
India (Pondicherry) .75 [.66, .84] .56 [.46, .63] .73 [.66, .78] 
India (Varanasi) .81 [.75, .87] .84 [.80, .87] .85 [.80, .88] 
Indonesia .63 [.53, .70] .76 [.71, .80] .79 [.74, .83] 
Israel .60 [.48, .70] .68 [.60, .75] .75 [.66, .80] 
Italy .64 [56, .69] .86 [.84, .88] .77 [.73, .82] 
Japan .62 [.53, .70] .81 [.75, .85] .89 [.85, .92] 
Poland .75 [.71, .80] .86 [.83, .87] .84 [.81, .86] 
Romania .59 [.41, .71] .81 [.73, .86] .69 [.58, .78] 
Russia .75 [.68, .80] .75 [.69, .80] .81 [.75, .85] 
South Africa .48 [.37, .59] .77 [.73, .81] .88 [.85, .91] 
Switzerland .78 [.72, .84] .80 [.73, .87] .78 [.66, .87] 
Turkey .69 [.61, .76] .86 [.83, .88] .83 [.78, .88] 
USA .66 [.58, .73] .85 [.82, .88] .87 [.83, .91] 
Note. CIs are bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (1000 bootstrap 
samples). The coefficient omega and the confidence intervals were obtained using the R-
package MBESS (Kelley & Lai, 2012). 
 
Secondly, psychological values of children represented psychological or 
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emotional reasons for having children. Sample items included “Because it is a 
joy to have a small baby” and “Because of the special feeling of love that 
develops between a parent and a child.” The scale was developed for the Value 
of Children Study (Trommsdorff et al., 2002). The cross-cultural construct 
equivalence of both value of children dimensions has been demonstrated 
(Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer & Trommsdorff, 2010). Coefficients omega of this 
7-item scale were acceptable or satisfactory between .72 and .90 with the 
exception of Romanian adolescents (omega = .69, see Table 2).  
Finally, we asked for the number of children adolescents would like to have 
in the future. First, we asked whether adolescents would like to have children 
in the future at all (categories: “yes/probably” / “I don’t know” / “no/probably 
not”). Those who answered “yes/probably” were subsequently asked to 
indicate the number of children they would like to have. To obtain a single 
continuous variable we combined the two questions by coding those who 
responded “no/probably not” to the first question with zero children in the 
second question. Participants responding “I don’t know” were coded with a 
missing value in this variable. 
 
 
Statistical Analyses 
 
We applied random coefficient hierarchical linear modeling (Luke, 2004; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to test the individual-level effects of religiosity 
(REL) and socioeconomic status (SES) as well as the culture-level effects of 
the Human Development Index (HDI), Traditional-Religious vs. Secular-
Rational Values (TR-SR) and of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values (S-SE) on 
the four variables of adolescents’ family orientation (FO).  
Culture is included as a random factor, and it is the aim of the model to 
explain the cultural and individual variation in adolescents’ family orientation 
by simultaneously considering culture-level and individual-level predictors. In 
a multilevel model two different kinds of regression equations are estimated. 
At the individual level (level-1), the respective outcome variable (FO) is 
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regressed on adolescents’ religiosity (REL) and their socioeconomic status 
(SES) where j indicates the culture, i the adolescent within a culture, β the 
regression coefficients at the individual level, and ε the error term at the 
individual level: 
FOij = β0j + β1jREL + β2jSES + εij 
 
The random effects (υ0j) of the intercept of this equation (β0j) represent the 
cross-cultural variation in the outcome variable. To explain this cross-cultural 
variation, we regressed β0j on the three culture-level predictors HDI, TR-SR, 
and S-SE:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01HDI + γ02TR-SR + γ03S-SE + υ0j 
 
In this level-2 equation for the intercept, γ00 represents the intercept, and γ01, 
γ02, and γ03 represent the regression coefficients for the respective level-2 
predictors. Finally, υ0j represents the level-2 residual of the random intercept 
(i.e., culture j’s deviation form the overall intercept γ00). The level-1 regression 
coefficients of REL and SES were fixed, i.e. they were not conceptualized as 
random effects and were not predicted by level-2 predictors. Their level-2 
equations therefore are  
β1j = γ10 and β2j = γ20.  
 
Inserting the three level-2 equations into the level-1 equation yields the 
overall multilevel model (‘intercept-as-outcome model’): 
FOij = γ00 + γ01HDI + γ02TR-SR + γ03S-SE + γ10REL + γ20SES + εij + υ0j 
 
The question is thus to what degree the culture-level predictors can predict 
the variation of adolescents’ family orientation across cultures (i.e., the 
intercept of the Level-1 equation) when the individual-level variables are held 
constant.  
We additionally tested the effects of every single culture-level predictor in 
separate models (see Talhelm et al., 2014, for a similar approach). With regard 
to the direction of effects of the WVS-variables, a positive effect of TR-SR on 
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β0j means that higher secular-rational values are related to a higher family 
orientation (i.e., a negative effect of TR-SR means a positive effect of 
traditional-religious values, our culture-level predictor of primary interest). In 
the same way, a positive effect of S-SE on β0j means that higher self-expression 
values are related to a higher family orientation. We proceeded in a stepwise 
fashion starting with the intercept-only model (Model 1) to determine whether 
the variance component of the intercept was significant, indicating cross-
cultural differences in the outcome variable. Then we computed the proportion 
of the overall variance of the dependent variable due to cross-cultural 
differences (intra-class correlation, ICC2).  
A significant intercept variance and substantial ICC are preconditions for 
using multilevel modeling since without cross-cultural differences in the 
dependent variable, there would be no need to explain those differences by 
culture-level variables. The second step was a level-1 only model including the 
two individual-level predictors religiosity (REL) and socioeconomic status 
(SES) (Model 2). Religiosity was entered group-centered per culture.  
This allowed us to only model individual-level variation in religiosity at 
level-1 which was essential because of the strong culture-level correlation 
between the culture means of religiosity and the level-2 (culture-level) 
predictor TR-SR representing religiosity at the cultural level (see Footnote 1). 
SES, on the other hand, was included in its original metric since it represented 
the relative socioeconomic status of an individual vis-à-vis his/her cultural 
group.  
The final model was the intercept-as-outcome model including the 
individual-level predictor’s religiosity (REL) and socioeconomic status (SES) 
as well as the all three culture-level predictors for the intercept (Model 3). The 
three alternative intercept-as-outcome models with a single culture-level 
                                                        
2  Defined as the proportion of the Level-2 variance relative to the overall variance of the 
dependent variable (in the intercept-only model):  
ICC = 
 
s
u0
2 s
u0
2 +s
e
2( )  
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predictor each are represented by Models 4-6.  
To estimate the proportion of individual-level variance explained by REL 
and SES we computed the proportional reduction of the individual-level 
residual variance in the level-1 model (Model 2) as compared to the intercept-
only model (Model 1); to estimate the proportion of culture-level variance 
explained by HDI, TR-SR, and/or S-SE we computed the proportional 
reduction of the variance component of the intercept in the respective intercept-
as-outcome model as compared to the intercept-only model. All multilevel 
analyses were conducted applying full maximum likelihood estimation (FML).  
In addition to significance testing the information criteria Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion 
based on the number of level-2 clusters m (BICm) were applied (Vallejo, Tuero-
Herrero, Núñez, & Rosário, 2013). 
 
 
Results 
 
The results of this sequence of multilevel analyses will be reported separately 
for the four dependent variables in the following. 
1. Traditional family values. The intercept-only model for traditional family 
values showed a significant intercept variance and an ICC of 0.26 (26% of the 
variance due to cross-cultural differences). In the level-1 model, the individual-
level effect of REL (γ10 = 0.10) was significant, indicating that a higher 
religiosity was related to a higher level of traditional family values, and the 
effect of SES (γ20 = 0.00) was non-significant (see table 3, Model 2).  
The explained variance at the individual level was 4%. In the intercept-as-
outcome model with all three predictors (Model 3) the level-2 effects of the 
HDI (γ01 = -1.26) and of TR-SR (γ02 = -0.18) were significantly negative while 
the effect of S-SE (γ03 = -0.02) was non-significant. The proportion of intercept 
variance explained by the three culture-level predictors was 74%. Models 4-6 
confirmed the effects found in Model 3, which also had their lowest values for 
both the AIC and the BICm.  
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates of Different Multilevel Models for the Dependent Variable 
Traditional Family Values 
DV: Traditional Family Values Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 4.24 56.29*** 4.24 51.94*** 5.34 13.01*** 
Religiosity (γ10)   0.10 14.19*** 0.10 14.20*** 
SES (γ20)   0.00   0.15 0.00   0.17 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01)     -1.26 -2.58* 
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)     -0.18 -3.33** 
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.02 -0.33 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .101 .102 .026 
Level-1 Residual (σ2ε) .281 .269 .264 
Information Criteria       
AIC 7295 7101 7083 
BICm 7297 7106 7090 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 5.98 16.36*** 4.30 71.42*** 4.23 54.38*** 
Religiosity (γ10) 0.10 14.19*** 0.10 14.20*** 0.10 14.19*** 
SES (γ20) 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.17 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01) -2.07 -4.83***     
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)   -0.27 -4.77***   
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.11 -1.48 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .044 .044 .090 
Level-1 Residual (σ2ε) .269 .269 .269 
Information Criteria       
AIC 7088 7089 7101 
BICm 7094 7094 7107 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Note. Model 1: Intercept-only. Model 2: Level-1-
only. Model 3: Intercept-as-Outcome (all three level-2 predictors). Model 4-6: Intercept-as-
Outcome (single level-2 predictors). AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BICm: Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion (Level-2). All Variance Components were significant at least at 
the p < .05-level. 
 
2. Utilitarian-normative VOC. The intercept-only model for the utilitarian-
normative VOC showed a significant intercept variance with an ICC of 0.39. 
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The individual-level effect of REL (γ10 = 0.06) was significant, indicating that a 
higher religiosity was related to a higher level of reported utilitarian-normative 
VOC. The effect of SES (γ20 = -0.04) was also significant, indicating that a 
higher socioeconomic status was related to lower utilitarian-normative VOC 
(see Table 4, Model 2). The explained variance at the individual level was 1%. 
In the intercept-as-outcome model with all three predictors (Model 3) the level-
2 effect of the HDI (γ01 = -3.97) was significantly negative while the effect of 
TR-SR (γ02 = -0.15) was marginally significant and that of S-SE (γ03 = -0.04) 
was non-significant. The combined proportion of explained variance of the 
intercept was 87%. When looking separately at the three predictors, the effects 
of HDI (Model 4), TR-SR (Model 5), and S-SE (Model 6) were all 
significantly negative. The proportion of explained variance for Model 4 was 
84%, indicating that the HDI alone explained almost as much of the intercept 
variance as all three culture-level predictors combined. Model 4 was also the 
best model according to BICm while the AIC was the same for Models 3 and 4. 
3. Psychological VOC. The intercept-only model for the psychological VOC 
showed a significant intercept variance with an ICC of 0.09. The individual-
level effect of REL (γ10 = 0.07) was significant, indicating that a higher 
religiosity was related to a higher level of reported psychological VOC, while 
the effect of SES (γ20 = 0.02) was non-significant (see Table 5, Model 2). The 
explained variance at the individual level was 1%. In the intercept-as-outcome 
model with all three predictors (Model 3) the level-2 effect of the HDI (γ01 = -
0.26) was non-significant while the effect of TR-SR (γ02 = -0.15) was 
significantly negative. The effect of S-SE (γ03 = -0.01) was non-significant. The 
combined proportion of explained variance of the intercept was 51%. When 
looking separately at the three predictors, the effects of HDI (Model 4) and TR-
SR (Model 5) were negatively significant while the effect of S-SE  (Model 6) 
was non-significant. The variable TR-SR alone explained almost as much of 
the intercept variance as all three culture-level predictors combined (49%), and 
Model 5 was also considered the best model according to both information 
criteria. 
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates of Different Multilevel Models for the Dependent 
Variable Utilitarian-normative VOC 
DV: Utilitarian-Normative VOC Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 2.56 17.81*** 2.67 17.91*** 6.06 10.77*** 
Religiosity (γ10)   0.06   6.43*** 0.06   6.43*** 
SES (γ20)   -0.04  -2.57* -0.04  -2.63** 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01)     -3.97 -5.91*** 
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)     -0.15 -2.01+ 
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.04 -0.52 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .369 .363 .048 
Residual (σ2ε) .567 .561 .561 
Information Criteria       
AIC 10515 10473 10443 
BICm 10518 10477 10450 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 6.68 15.41*** 2.77 23.81*** 2.66 20.02*** 
Religiosity (γ10) 0.06   6.43*** 0.06   6.43*** 0.06   6.43*** 
SES (γ20) -0.04  -2.59** -0.04  -2.60** -0.04  -2.55** 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01) -4.74 -9.34***     
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)   -0.43 -3.41**   
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.30 -2.33* 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .060 .220 .278 
Residual (σ2ε) .561 .561 .561 
Information Criteria       
AIC 10443 10466 10470 
BICm 10448 10471 10475 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Note. Model 1: Intercept-only. Model 2: Level-1-
only. Model 3: Intercept-as-Outcome (all three level-2 predictors). Model 4-6: Intercept-as-
Outcome (single level-2 predictors). AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BICm: Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion (Level-2). All Variance Components were significant at least at the p < .05-
level. 
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Table 5. Parameter Estimates of Different Multilevel Models for the Dependent 
Variable Psychological VOC 
DV: Psychological VOC Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 3.97 75.94*** 3.91 58.51*** 4.16 10.54*** 
Religiosity (γ10)   0.07   7.57*** 0.07   7.57*** 
SES (γ20)   0.02   1.48 0.02   1.57 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01)     -0.26  -0.56 
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)     -0.15  -2.88* 
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.01  -0.27 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .047 .047 .023 
Residual (σ2ε) .498 .492 .492 
Information Criteria       
AIC 9889 9833 9827 
BICm 9892 9838 9834 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 4.69 14.02*** 3.94 69.05*** 3.90 58.84*** 
Religiosity (γ10) 0.07   7.57*** 0.07   7.57*** 0.07   7.57*** 
SES (γ20) 0.02   1.57 0.02   1.52 0.02   1.50 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01) -0.93 -2.37*     
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)   -0.17 -3.94**   
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     -0.04 -0.75 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .035 .024 .046 
Residual (σ2ε) .492 .492 .492 
Information Criteria       
AIC 9830 9824 9835 
BICm 9836 9829 9840 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Note. Model 1: Intercept-only. Model 2: Level-1-
only. Model 3: Intercept-as-Outcome (all three level-2 predictors). Model 4-6: Intercept-as-
Outcome (single level-2 predictors). AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BICm: Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion (Level-2). All Variance Components were significant at least at the p < .05-
level. 
 
The Role of Religiosity and Affluence for Adolescents’ Family Orientation                          B. Mayer et al.  
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 7 (3), 2015  
 
76 
 
4. Intended number of children. The intercept-only model for the intended 
number of children showed a intercept variance with an ICC of 0.21 (Table, 6).  
 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates of Different Multilevel Models for the Dependent 
Variable Intended Number of Children 
DV: Intended Number of Children Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 2.12 17.32*** 1.99 14.39*** 0.09 0.08 
Religiosity (γ10)   0.15 9.86*** 0.15 9.86*** 
SES (γ20)   0.04 2.01* 0.04 1.94+ 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01)     2.34 1.87+ 
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)     -0.29 -2.12* 
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     0.07 0.56 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .265 .259 .170 
Residual (σ2ε) 1.02 .991 .991 
Information Criteria       
AIC 10775 10677 10676 
BICm 10777 10682 10683 
Intended Number of Children Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effects Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Level 1       
Intercept (γ00) 0.74 0.88 2.02 14.53*** 2.00 15.39 
Religiosity (γ10) 0.15 9.86*** 0.15 9.86*** 0.15 9.86*** 
SES (γ20) 0.04 1.97* 0.04 2.01* 0.04 1.96* 
Level 2       
Human Development Index (γ01) 1.48 1.50     
Traditional/Secular-Rational (γ02)   -0.13 -0.94   
Survival/Self-Expression (γ03)     0.20 1.78+ 
Variance Components       
Random Intercept (σ2υ0) .230 .247 .219 
Residual (σ2ε) .991 .991 .991 
Information Criteria       
AIC 10676 10678 10676 
BICm 10682 10684 10681 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Note. Model 1: Intercept-only. Model 2: Level-1-
only. Model 3: Intercept-as-Outcome (all three level-2 predictors). Model 4-6: Intercept-as-
Outcome (single level-2 predictors). AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BICm: Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion (Level-2). All Variance Components were significant at least at 
the p < .05-level. 
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The individual-level effects of REL (γ10 = 0.15) and of SES (γ20 = 0.04) 
were both positively significant, indicating that a higher religiosity as well as a 
higher SES were related to a higher intended number of children (see Table 6, 
Model 2).  
The explained variance at the individual level was 3%. In the intercept-as-
outcome model with all three predictors (Model 3) the level-2 effect of the HDI 
(γ01 = 2.34) was marginally significant while the effect of TR-SR (γ02 = -0.29) 
was negatively significant.  
The effect of S-SE (γ03 = 0.07) was non-significant. The combined 
proportion of explained variance of the intercept was 36%. For the separate 
models, the effects of HDI (Model 4) and TR-SR (Model 5) were non-
significant while the effect of S-SE (Model 6) was marginally significant. The 
best model according to the BICm was Model 6 including only S-SE while the 
AIC did not differentiate among Models 3, 4, and 6. A ‘reciprocal suppression’ 
seems to occur in Model 3: since HDI and TR-SR were positively correlated (r 
= .53) but their effects on the dependent variable were in opposite directions, 
the discrepancy of their unique effects is accentuated in the model with all 
three predictors. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
To summarize the results of the individual level analyses, adolescents’ 
religiosity was positively related to all four aspects of family orientation, but 
the effects were quite weak. The strongest individual-level effect of religiosity 
resulted for traditional family values (about 4% explained variance), the second 
strongest for the intended number of children (about 3% explained variance). 
Overall, religious doctrines regarding the family may be mostly related to the 
traditional hierarchical aspects of family orientation, as well as to the 
importance of having children.  
With the exception of a weak negative effect on utilitarian-normative VOC 
no significant effects were found for SES at the individual level. The variations 
in family orientations within cultures thus seem to be mostly independent of 
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SES. The results may not be generalizable beyond the mostly (respective) 
middle-class adolescents and their “relative” SES in our study. Since we did 
not have precise expectations with regard to SES as an individual-level 
predictor we will not further discuss this result. 
With regard to the culture-level analyses, the strongest cross-cultural 
differences (ICCs) were found for the utilitarian-normative VOC (ICC = 0.39) 
and for the traditional family values (ICC = 0.26), both representing traditional 
aspects of family orientation. We expected that indicators representing a 
secular-rational orientation and economic development would be strongly 
related to these aspects based on secularization and modernization theoretical 
arguments. The results show that this was the case: For traditional family 
values as dependent variable, secular-rational values (TR-SR) and economic 
development (HDI) together explained about 74% of the culture-level variance 
(both predictors had similar predictive strength in the single predictor models 
with 56% and 57% explained variance, respectively). For utilitarian-normative 
VOC as dependent variable, economic development and secular-rational values 
even explained 87% of cross-cultural differences in the joint model (with 
secular-rational values being only marginally significant), and economic 
development alone explained 84%, showing that the level of utilitarian-
normative VOC in a culture was strongly dependent on the level of affluence in 
this group, and very much less so to a low importance of religious values. 
When compared to the relatively weak individual-level effects reported above, 
the large proportions of explained variances in the culture-level analyses also 
exemplify the power of the cultural context in shaping relatively homogenous 
values syndromes.  
While the effects of economic development (HDI) were very strong for the 
two traditional aspects of adolescents’ family orientation (as just described), it 
was irrelevant for the two more general, personal, and future-oriented aspects 
of adolescents’ family orientation (psychological VOC and the intended 
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number of children)3. Instead, the level of religiosity played the main role for 
these two variables. Though cross-cultural differences of psychological VOC 
were small (ICC = .08), about half of this variation (51% in the joint model and 
49% in the single-predictor model) was accounted for by the effect of secular-
rational values. Thus, adolescents from secular-rational cultures valued 
psychological reasons for having children less than the adolescents from more 
religious cultures. The cross-cultural variation in the intended number of 
children was substantial (ICC = .21), but the prediction of this variation 
through the three culture-level indicators was rather weak: in the joint model 
only a negative effect of secular-rational values was significant, indicating that 
adolescents from secular-rational cultures wanted somewhat fewer children 
than adolescents from more religious cultures. An important aspect here is that 
the substantial cross-cultural variation in this variable was mostly due to 
outliers reporting a very high (Israeli adolescents) or a very low (Chinese 
adolescents) intended number of children for reasons related to the special 
political and ideological situations of these countries. Adolescents from almost 
all remaining cultures reported that they want to have about two children on 
average (see also Mayer & Trommsdorff, 2010). Thus, the intended number of 
children has more or less converged globally to a norm close to replacement 
level, but people in highly industrialized cultures seem to want more children 
                                                        
3 Though there was no significant effect of HDI on psychological VOC in the joint model, there 
was a significant negative effect in the single predictor model, which needs explanation. The 
original Value of Children approach (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982) suggested that the psychological 
VOC should be higher in cultures with higher affluence, since psychological/emotional reasons 
for having children should gain in salience when other reasons for having children (social-
normative and utilitarian-economic) lose influence. However, as discussed by Mayer (2013) and 
Mayer and Trommsdorff (2010), the psychological VOC may be more salient in affluent cultures 
(because of a very low utilitarian-normative VOC), but may be nevertheless higher (in absolute 
terms) in less affluent cultures where an overall higher family orientation may be observed. Our 
results confirm this hypothesis with the limitation that the significant effect of affluence 
disappears when partialling out the co-variation with secular-rationality in the joint predictor 
model.   
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than they actually get later, whereas people in less industrialized cultures still 
get more children than they actually want (although fertility has decreased 
tremendously in these cultures as well over the last decades). This is not in 
contradiction to the relevance of future-oriented family orientation for 
individual behavior. Behavioral intentions regarding a future family are 
ideational elements that can have substantial effects on future behavior in 
addition to and independent of structural factors (Barber, 2001; Jayakody, 
Thornton, & Axinn, 2008). 
Overall, thus, culture-level secular-rational values were negatively related to 
all aspects of family orientation but the level of socioeconomic development 
(HDI) of a culture was negatively related only to adolescents’ traditional family 
values and to their utilitarian–normative VOC, both of which represent what 
we have termed traditional hierarchical aspects of adolescents’ family 
orientation. Thus, adolescents from more religious cultures were more family-
oriented with regard to both traditional and non-traditional aspects than were 
adolescents from less religious cultures, but adolescents from richer cultures 
reported a lower importance of the family only for the traditional aspects 
related to hierarchy/patriarchy and to material/economic interdependencies in 
the family. Self-expression values were the weakest culture-level predictor of 
adolescents’ family orientation; it did not reach significance when included 
with the other two predictors.  
Though we have to be cautious with regard to the extrapolation of these 
cross-sectional results to cultural change over time, our results seem to provide 
new insights with regard to relations among secularization, modernization, 
postmodernization, and family change. In Inglehart’s approach, both the 
decline of religion/increase of secular-rational orientations (Norris & Inglehart, 
2011) as well as the increase of self-expression orientations (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005) are caused to a significant extent by economic development. 
However, it is difficult to explain why secular-rational and self-expression 
orientations are hardly correlated. It is possible that secularization and 
psychological modernization/postmodernization are relatively independent 
processes (Beck, 2010). The current study provides evidence with regard to the 
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joint contribution of all three pertinent indicators to family change, which 
constitutes another hot topic in the modernization debate. The result that the 
autonomy-individualism syndrome (in terms of self-expression values) was 
unrelated to all aspects of adolescents’ family orientation and that economic 
development per se had no impact on the general and future-oriented aspects of 
adolescents’ family orientation suggests that modernization does not lead to a 
general decline of the family. These results are in line with theoretical 
approaches questioning a general decline of the family when societies 
modernize (e.g., Bengtson, 2001; Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007). This is in line with other 
studies showing that traditional (hierarchical and patriarchal) aspects of the 
family seem to be more affected by modernization and economic development 
than psychological relational aspects as well as the importance of the family in 
general (Georgas et al., 2006; Mayer, Trommsdorff, Kağıtçıbaşı, & Mishra, 
2012; see also Mayer, 2013). What these alternative accounts of family change 
do not include, however, is the religious factor. Our results suggest that when 
economic affluence is accompanied by a low importance of religion, then all 
aspects of adolescent family orientation that were considered here will be 
negatively affected, though the more general and personal ones not to a large 
extent.  
 
 
Limitations and Conclusions 
 
Limitations of the present study include the sole reliance on adolescents’ 
reported importance of religion, not distinguishing between religious 
denominations. Also, our results from cross-sectional studies cannot indicate 
cultural change (Thornton, 2005). Furthermore, we only analyzed fixed effects 
of religiosity and socioeconomic status at the individual level, and therefore 
could not explore possible cross-cultural variation of individual-level effects 
(but see Mayer & Trommsdorff, 2012, for an analysis of the cross-level 
interaction effect of culture-level aggregated religiosity on the strength of the 
individual-level effect of religiosity on adolescents family orientation). 
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Therefore, future research has to look deeper into the culture-specific aspects 
of religiosity and its role in adolescent development (Belzen, 2010). 
Nevertheless, religions share features of spirituality and normativity, rendering 
religiosity a unique aspect of the adolescent experience across cultures. A 
further limitation is that we solely look at adolescents’ value orientations and 
future-oriented plans, but not at actual behavior, nor at other generations. 
Therefore, notions of family decline in the context of the results of the present 
study can only be understood with regard to adolescents’ ideas about families.  
The family as a potential source of social and cultural capital, as a safe 
haven, and as the central place to satisfy basic human dependency needs 
represents an important mediating link in the relation between religiosity and 
well-being. The results presented here indicate that living in a religious culture 
and personally being religious are both related to a higher family orientation 
for adolescents. In this sense, individual religiosity may act as a buffer for a 
decreasing significance of the family at the individual level. However, the 
effects of individual religiosity on family orientation were rather weak when 
compared to the culture-level effects of religiosity. The results also showed that 
economic development and secularization in a culture have to be considered 
independently for predicting adolescents’ family orientation: Economic 
development is clearly linked to processes that release or disconnect 
adolescents from traditional, hierarchical, and obedience-related views on the 
family, but it does not contribute to a loss of significance of the family per se.  
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